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Preemption of ERISA Pension Plan 
Exemptions in the Aftermath of 
Mackey v. Lanier Collections 
Agency & Service, Inc.: A Glimmer 
of Light at the End of the Tunnel 
I. Introduction 
As the partner in charge of your firm's 
bankruptcy and creditors' rights prac-
tice, you are consulted by a prominent 
orthopaedic surgeon. Your client in-
forms you that he has recently been 
named as a defendant in two serious 
medical malpractice actions and may be 
substantially underinsured with respect 
to such claims. Further, he tells you that 
during the early 1980s he invested in a 
number of tax shelter schemes in the 
form of real estate limited partnerships 
on which he has executed personal guar-
anties for several million dollars of in-
debtedness. You are aware that many of 
these investments suffered Significant 
depreciation during the past several 
years due to a softening real estate 
market. A few of the lenders holding the 
loan guaranties have already informed 
him that the loans are in default and that, 
if the projects are foreclosed upon, 
there will likely be substantial deficien-
cies which the lenders expect to collect 
from him. 
As have most of his colleagues, your 
client has invested heavily (over 
$2,000,000.00 in his case) in an ERISA-
qualified retirement plan.! He says that 
some years ago he was advised (not, 
thank, heavens, by your firm) that the 
pension plan asset would be considered 
exempt if, as he is fearful is now happen-
ing, claims or judgments based upon 
medical malpractice suits or real estate 
partnership loan guaranties caused him 
to file a voluntary petition under Chap-
ter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code to discharge the debts. 
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You then ask him to be seated as you 
begin to explain the ramifications of a 
1988 United States Supreme Court deci-
sion, Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency 
& Service, Inc. 2 You watch the color 
slowly disappear from his face as you 
explain that the monies which he had so 
prudently invested when he set up his 
ERISA retirement plan in 1975 could be 
taken away from him. If he should 
become a debtor in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, you explain, the pension plan is 
likely to be considered part of the bank-
ruptcy estate and thus subject to distri-
bution to assist in paying the claims of 
his creditors. 
The doctor is incredulous and pro-
tests that he knows from having attended 
a seminar on pension planning some 
years ago put on by the local medical 
society that the plan is exempt under 
the laws of your state. In fact, as you are 
acutely aware, your state "opted out" of 
the federal exemption scheme set forth 
in 11 U.S.c. §522( d).3 This seemingly 
makes immune to creditor claims "any 
monies or other benefits payable from, 
or any interest in, certain retirement 
plans, such as those qualified under 
§401(a), §403(a), §403(b), §408, 
§414(d), or §414(e) of the United 
. States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended."4 
As your client sinks more deeply into 
his chair, you explain that the Mackey 
case to which you have alluded will 
probably serve to invalidate the exemp-
tion statute. Mackey held that "state 
laws which are specifically designed to 
affect employee benefits plans are pre-
empted under § 514( a)" of ERISA, 29 
U.S.c. §1144(a).s 
You tell him that upon the filing of a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in which 
a claim for an exemption for his interest 
in the retirement plan is made, the bank-
ruptcy trustee will no doubt object to 
the declared exemption. The trustee 
will argue that the statute which pur-
ports to allow the exception is pre-
empted by ERISA, and therefore he 
should not be entitled to an exemption 
for the assets held in the pension plan. 
Your client's face goes from white to 
red. He angrily states that ERISA, accord-
ing to the seminar put on by the medical 
society, was designed to protect pen-
sion plans from the very fate which you 
are describing. How could it be con-
strued as preempting a state law which 
purports to have the identical intention, 
i.e., protecting retirement plans from 
interference by creditors of a plan partic-
ipant? 
His day only gets worse as you explain 
the ruling in In re Hirsch,6 which even-
tually became the first district court rul-
ing adopting the Mackey decision to 
ERISA pension plan benefit exemptions 
in bankruptcy. In Hirsch, the court 
voided the Arizona statutory exemption 
for ERISA-qualified pension plans7, 
which is similar in substance to most 
other state pension plan exemption stat-
utes, and held that the debtor's interest 
in such pension plans were not pro-
tected from the claims of bankruptcy 
creditors. 
The Mackey decision, you explain to 
your now thoroughly exasperated client, 
has served to create a windfall to the 
bankruptcy estate by rendering ineffec-
tive the traditional state law ERISA pen-
sion plan benefit exemptions. As both 
you and he know, many business profes-
sionals who may earn hundreds of thou-
sands or perhaps millions of dollars per 
year often set aside tens or sometimes 
hundreds of thousands of dollars into 
ERISA-qualified pension plans, assuming 
that the funds will be exempt from 
claims of bankruptcy creditors by virtue 
of either the state or federal exemption 
scheme. However, follOwing Mackey 
and its progeny, most bankruptcy courts 
have held that a debtor'S interests in 
such pension plans are not protected 
under the state law exemption statutes 
from the reach of a bankruptcy trustee. 
Those state statutes are deemed ex-
pressly preempted by ERISA, despite the 
recognition that the state ERISA pension 
plan exemption statutes may help effec-
tuate ERISA's underlying purposes of 
protecting certain benefits from credi-
tor execution. S Further, with the excep-
tion of a few recent decisions, most 
courts have also held that there is no 
applicable federal exemption from 
property of the bankruptcy estate pro-
vided by ERISA. 
At the conclusion of your analysis, 
your client appears confused and dis-
traught. He implores you to give him his 
"bottom line," what he can expect; i.e., 
is there any possibility that his penSion 
plan will not be taken from him by a 
bankruptcy trustee? Under present case 
law, the answer, is that the plan will 
probably be deemed a bankruptcy estate 
asset and thus subject to claims of credi-
tors although a few recent cases may 
provide a glimmer of hope. 
The dicta in the Mackey decision 
regarding the applicability of ERISA's 
anti-aliention provision to state garnish-
ment procedures was recently revisited 
in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Na-
tional Pension Fund.9 The Guidry Court 
affirmatively declared that § 206( d )( 1 ) 
of ERISAIO places explicit statutory re-
strictions on assignment or alienation of 
pension benefits, creating an absolute 
bar to garnishment of plan benefits, 
unless some exception to the general 
statutory plan is applicable. 
Based upon the dicta in Mackey, as 
clarified by the holding in Guidry con-
cerning the anti-alienation provi-
sions of ERISA and the intention of Con-
gress to create a federal exemption from 
involuntary alienation of pension bene-
fits by the adoption of §206( d)( 1) of 
ERISA, some courts have recently con-
cluded that §206( d)( 1 ) of ERISA serves 
to create an available nonbankruptcy 
exemption for ERISA pension plan bene-
fits under 11 U.S.C §522(b)(2)(A).1l 
However, at least one court has recog-
nized §206( d)( 1) as creating a restric-
tion on the transfer of ERISA plan bene-
fits that is enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law as provided under 
11 U.S.C §541(c)(2).12Thisarticlewill 
discuss the status of the law regarding 
state ERISA plan exemption statutes in 
the aftermath oftheMackEo'decision, recent 
case law developments interpreting the 
Guidry decision as providing a separate 
federal exemption for ERISA pension 
plan benefits, and how the different 
approaches taken by bankruptcy courts 
to the ERISA pension plan benefit prob-
lem tend to further serve or negate the 
congressional intent in enacting 
§206(d) of ERISA, 29 US.C §1056(d). 
II. Preemption of State Law: 
ERISA Exemptions Under Mackey 
In Mackey v. Lanier Collections 
Agency & Service, Inc., I3 the Supreme 
Court considered whether and to what 
extent a Georgia statutel4 barring the 
garnishment of funds or benefits of an 
employee benefit plan or program which 
was subject to ERISA was preempted by 
§514(a)15 governing such plans. A col-
lection agency obtained a money judg-
ment against several pension plan par-
ticipants and instituted an action in a 
Georgia state court to garnish the plan 
benefits. The plan participants asserted 
that the Georgia statute, barring the 
garnishment of"[ fjunds or benefits of .. 
[an] employee benefit plan or program 
subject to [ERISA]"16 exempted those 
plan benefits from garnishment. The 
trial court granted the garnishment 
request, but the Georgia Court of Ap-
peals reversed and held that the Georgia 
statute barred garnishment. The Geor-
gia Supreme Court reversed the appel-
late court, holding that the Georgia gar-
nishment exemption relating to ERISA 
employee welfare benefit plans was pre-
empted and displaced by ERISA "'since 
it purports to regulate garnishment of 
ERISA funds and benefits, a matter spe-
cifically provided for' in the federal 
scheme."I7 
Due to conflicting decisions among 
state and federal courts on the ERISA pre-
emption issue, the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and affirmed 
the holding of the Georgia Supreme 
Court. In affirming the judgment, the 
Supreme Court examined the preemp-
tion issue as follows: 
ERISA §514(a) pre-empts "any 
and all state laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan" covered 
by the statute. 29US.C §1144(a). 
We believe that under our prece-
dents, Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 is 
such a state law. 
The Georgia statute at issue here 
expressly refers to - indeed, solely 
applies to - ERISA employee bene-
fit plans. "A law 'relates to' an 
employee benefit plan, in the nor-
mal sense of the phrase, if it has a 
connection with or reference to 
such a plan." On several occasions 
since our decision in Shaw [v. 
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 
(1983)], we have reaffirmed this 
rule, concluding that state laws 
which make "reference to" ERISA 
plans are laws that "relate to" 
those plans within the meaning of 
§ 514( a). In fact, we have virtually 
taken it for granted that state laws 
which are "specifically designed 
to effect employee benefit plans" 
are preempted under §514(a).ls 
The Supreme Court also considered 
the argument that the statute should not 
be preempted by ERISA because it was 
enacted by the Georgia legislature to 
help effectuate ERISA's underlying pur-
poses, and as such was not in conflict 
with ERISA In this regard, the Court 
held as follows: 
The possibility that § 18-4-22.1 
was enacted by the Georgia legis-
lature to help effectuate ERISA's 
underlying purposes - the view 
of the Georgia Court of Appeals 
below, see 178 Ga. App., at 467, 
343 S.E.2d, at 493 - is not enough 
to save the state law from pre-
emption. "The pre-emption provi-
sion [of§514(a)] ... displace[s] all 
state laws that fall within its sphere, 
even including state laws that are 
consistent with ERISA's substan-
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tive requirements." ... Legislative 
"good intentions" do not save a 
state law within the broad pre-
emptive scope of § 5 14( a). 
Consequently, adhering to our 
precedents in this area, we hold 
that Ga. Code Ann. §18-4-22.1, 
which singles out ERISA employee 
welfare benefit plans for different 
treatment under state garnishment 
procedures, is preempted under 
§ 5 14( a). The state statute's ex-
press reference to ERISA plans suf-
fices to bring it within the federal 
law's preemptive reach. 19 
An overwhelming majority of bank-
ruptcy courts have interpreted the 
Mackey decision as a mandate to invali-
date those state statutes which serve to 
effectuate the underlying purposes of 
ERISA by providing certain exemptions 
from the reach of creditors and bank-
ruptcy trustees for ERISA-qualifed pen-
sion plan benefits.20 As expressly pro-
vided in ERISA, the primary policy of 
ERISA is to protect the interests of par-
ticipants in employee benefit plans and 
their beneficiaries from certain creditor 
execution.21 However, in order to create 
a uniform pension law, §514(a) also 
explicitly preempts "any and all state 
laws insofar as they may now or here-
after relate to any employee benefit 
plan" covered by ERISA.22 The Supreme 
Court's interpretation §514(a) in 
Mackey has served to create a windfall 
to the bankruptcy estate by rendering 
ineffective traditional state law ERISA-
qualfied pension plan benefit exemp-
tions. This interpretation or such an 
interpretation is clearly contrary to the 
congressional intent expressed in ERISA 
§2(b) to extend antialienation protec-
tion to certain ERISA pension plan bene-
fits. 23 
III. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers 
National Pension Fund: Mackey 
Revisited 
The Supreme Court revisited Mackey 
in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Na-
tional Pension Fund, 24 and, in so doing, 
may have provided an avenue for relief 
from the harsh effect of the Mackey 
decision upon the interests of a bank-
ruptcy debtor in an ERISA-qualified pen-
sion plan. At issue in Guidrywas whether 
a labor union could impose a construc-
tive trust upon an employee's pension 
benefits under an ERISA-qualified plan 
in order to recover losses incurred by 
the union resulting from the employee's 
embezzlement of pension trust funds. 
The employee, Guidry, pleaded guilty to 
embezzling funds from a labor union in 
violation of § 50 1 ( c) of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act of 1959.25 Guidry then filed suit in 
United States District Court against two 
of the union pension plans after the plan 
trustees asserted that he had forfeited 
his rights to benefits under those plans 
as a result of his criminal activity. The 
labor union then intervened as a third 
party and prior to trial stipulated with 
Guidry to the entry of a money judgment 
in its favor. 26 
ff [TJ he primary policy 
of ERISA is to protect 
the interests of 
participants in 
employee benefit plans 
and their beneficiaries 
from certain creditor 
execution. " 
The district court rejected the con-
tention that Guidry had forfeited his 
rights to benefits as a result of his crimi-
nal activity, but ruled that a constructive 
trust in favor of the union should be 
imposed upon Guidry's pension benefits 
until the judgment was satisfied.27 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that a narrow 
exception to the ERISA prohibition on 
assignment or alienation of pension bene-
fits under §206(d)(I) of ERISA was 
appropriate where "the viability of a 
union and the members' pension plans 
was damaged by the knavery of a union 
official. "28 The decision of the district 
court was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which 
concluded that §206( d)(1) did not 
preclude the imposition of a construc-
tive trust, and it was unlikely that Con-
gress intended to ignore equitable prin-
cipals by protecting plan beneficiaries 
such as Guidry from the consequences 
of their misconduct.29 
Because the various federal courts of 
appeal had expressed differing views 
concerning the availability of the excep-
tions to ERISA's anti-alienation provi-
sion, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari, and held that the remedy of a 
constructive trust against Guidry's ERISA 
plan was not available. In so doing, the 
Court looked to its dicta in Mackey, in 
which the Court previously held that, 
although ERISA does not bar the gar-
nishment of welfare (e.g., vacation) bene-
fits, §206( d)( 1) does erect a general 
bar to the garnishment of pension benef-
its from plans covered by the Act.30 In 
analyzing the precise language in 
Mackey, the Court stated as follows: 
The view that the statutory re-
strictions on assignment or alie-
nation of pension benefits apply 
to garnishment is consistent with 
applicable administrative regula-
tions, with the relevant legislative 
history, and with the view of other 
federal courts. It is also consonant 
with other statutory provisions de-
signed to safeguard retirement in-
come. We see no meaningful dis-
tinction between a writ of gar-
nishment and the constructive 
trust remedy imposed in this case. 
That remedy is therefore prohib-
ited by §206( d)(1) unless some 
exception to the general statutory 
ban is applicable.31 
In reaching this conclusion, the 
Supreme Court expressed its views on 
the congreSSional intent behind the 
anti-alienation provisions of ERISA 
§206( d) as follows: 
Section 206( d ) reflects a con-
side red congreSSional policy 
choice, a decision to safeguard a 
stream of income for pensioners 
(and their dependents, who may 
be, and usually are, blameless), 
even if that decision prevents 
others from securing relief for the 
wrongs done them. If exceptions 
to this policy are to be made, it is 
for Congress to undertake that 
task.32 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held 
that it was the clear intent of Congress 
to create a federal exemption from invol-
untary alienation of pension benefits by 
the adoption of ERISA §206( d). 
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IV. General Issues Addressed by Claim 
of Exemption for ERISA Plan 
Benefits 
When a trustee objects to a debtor's 
claim of exemption for ERISA-qualified 
pension plan benefits, there are two 
general issues which will arise: first, 
whether the debtor's interest in the plan 
becomes property of the bankruptcy 
estate under § 541 of the Bankruptcy 
Code upon filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion; and second, if the interest of the 
debtor in an ERISA pension plan be-
comes property of the estate under § 541, 
whether the interest may be declared 
exempt by the debtor from administra-
tion of the bankruptcy estate under 
§522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Fur- . 
ther, in attempting to declare the deb-
tor's interest in an ERISA-qualified pen-
sion plan exempt under §522(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, two additional issues 
may arise: first, whether the debtor's 
interest may be delcared exempt under 
a state statutory exemption; and second, 
whether the debtor's interest may be 
declared exempt under applicable fed-
eral nonbankruptcy law as prescribed by 
§522(b )(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
V. Treatment of Debtor's Interest in 
ERISA Plan Under §541 
The threshold question when a bank-
ruptcy debtor claims an exemption for 
his interest in an ERISA-qualified pen-
sion plan is whether the debtor's plan 
interests are property of the bankruptcy 
estate pursuant to §541 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Under § 541 all property in 
which a debtor has a legal or equitable 
interest at the time of filing becomes 
part of the bankruptcy estate. 33 
Section 541 ( c)( 2) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, however, grants an exception to 
§ 541 (a)( 1) by providing that "[a] res-
triction on the transfer of a beneficial 
interest of the debtor in a trust that is 
enforceable under applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law is enforceable in a case under 
this title."34 Accordingly, §541(c)(2) 
prevents any such interest from being 
included in the bankruptcy estate.35 
Courts have traditionally construed 
§541(c)(2) as not including ERISA-
qualified pension plans, holding that "ap-
plicable non-bankruptcy law," as refer-
enced in §541(c)(2), referred only to 
state law concerning spendthrift trusts, 
so that ERISA-qualifed pension plans 
containing anti-alienation provisions 
were excluded pursuant to §541( c)(2) 
only if they were enforceable under 
state spendthrift trust law.36 Recently, 
however, courts have begun to recog-
nize that the anti-alienation provision 
set forth in ERISA §206( d)(1) should 
qualify as "applicable nonbankruptcy 
law" for purposes of §541( c)(2). 
In In re Moore, 37 the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit addressed the 
issue of whether the interests of several 
debtors in an ERISA-qualified profit shar-
ing and pension plan were property of 
their bankruptcy estates under § 541 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy 
trustee filed suit seeking turnover ofthe 
debtors' interests in the ERISA-qualified 
plan. The plan administrator asserted 
that the debtors' interests in the plan 
were not subject to turnover because 
they were protected by an enforceable 
restriction on transfer under ERISA 
which the Bankruptcy Code recognized 
as dispositive "applicable non-bank-
ruptcy law" for purposes of exclusion 
from property of the bankruptcy estate 
under §541 ( c)( 2). On appeal, the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed 
with the plan administrator and held 
that the debtors' interests in the plan 
were not property of their respective 
bankruptcy estates due to the provisions 
of § 541 ( c)( 2), and therefore were not 
subject to turnover to the trustee in 
bankruptcy. 38 
The court of appeals looked to the 
meaning of the term "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" as used in §541( c)(2) 
and rejected the notion that the term as 
used in that statute was strictly limited 
to state spendthrift trust law.39 In sup-
port of its holding, the court stated asfollows: 
The trustee in bankruptcy's nar-
row interpretation of § 541 ( c ) ( 2 ) 
cannot be squared with the sec-
tion's broad language. "Applicable 
nonbankruptcy law" means pre-
cisely what it says: all laws, state 
and federal, under which a transfer 
restriction is enforceable. Nothing 
in the phrase "applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law" or in the remainder of 
§ 541 (c)( 2) suggests that the 
phrase refers exclusively to state 
law, much less to state spendthrift 
trust law. 
In addition to violating the plain 
language of§541(c)(2), the trus-
tee's interpretation of "applicable 
nonbankruptcy law" is not con-
sistent with other uses of the iden-
tical phrase throughout the Bank-
ruptcy Code. In numerous places 
in the Bankruptcy Code, the term 
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" is 
used to refer to federal as well as 
state law .... 
"[A] word is presumed to have 
the same meaning in all subsec-
tions of the same statute." It is 
incongruous to give the same 
phrase in §541(c)(2) a narrower 
construction than the identical 
phrase in other parts of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, particularly since the 
disparate sections of the Bank-
ruptcy Code were enacted to-
gether in a single comprehensive 
statute.40 
In considering the congreSSional in-
tent behind §541(c)(2) and the "ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law" language, 
the court stated: 
"[ I] f Congress had intended 
§ 541 ( c)( 2) to only apply to state 
spendthrift trusts, the term 'spend-
thrift trust' would have appeared 
in the statute, rather than the 
phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy 
law.'" The term "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" suggests no lim-
itation to state spendthrift trust 
law, and we refuse to read such a 
limitation into the statute.41 
Although the Moore court recognized 
that several circuits had defined the 
term" applicable nonbankruptcy law" in 
§ 541 ( c)( 2) narrowly to refer only to 
state spendthrift trust law,42 it rejected 
those decisions because they were pur-
portedly based upon the legislative his-
tory of §541(c)(2), which the court 
deemed irrelevant because it found the 
language of the statute on its face un-
ambiguous: 
An appeal to legislative history is 
inappropriate here because the 
language of §541( c)( 2) is clear. 
"Legislative history is irrelevant to 
the interpretation of an unambig-
uous statute." ... Congress enacted 
§541(c)(2), not its accompany-
ing legislative reports. We have no 
authority to limit the scope of a 
clear statutory term by recourse to 
the views of a legislative sub-
groUp.43 
ConSequently, the court concluded that 
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"[ t ]he clarity of the statutory term ['ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law' under 
§541(c)(2)] is simply not clouded by 
the legislative history,"44 such that the 
anti -alienation provisions of § 206( d )( 1 ) 
of ERISA contain an enforceable transfer 
restriction that would bring the statute 
within the meaning of the term "appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law" excluding 
the plan benefits from the bankruptcy 
estate pursuant to §541(c)(2).45 
likewise, in In re Kincaid, 46 Judge 
Fletcher, in a persuasive concurring 
opinion, expressed his doubts about the 
traditional ruling that the term "appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law" under 
§ 541 (c)( 2) referred solely to state 
spendthrift trust law. In his concur-
rence, Judge Fletcher stated that the 
debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified 
pension plan was properly protected by 
ERISA's restrictions on transfer from 
the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 
§541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Recognizing the reasoning of the fourth 
circuit in Moore, he also exposed the 
flaws in the legislative history approach 
taken by numerous other circuits in 
interpreting the term "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" under §541(c)(2). In 
addition, he acknowledged the congres-
sional intent in establishing § 206( d )( 1 ) 
of ERISA, as set forth in the applicable 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 
and accompanying Treasury Regulations, 
and concluded as follows: 
Further, both ERISA's purpose 
and its statutory scheme indicate 
that it properly constitutes "appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law." ERISA 
aims to ensure that "if a worker has 
been promised a defined pension 
benefit upon retirement - and if 
he has fulfilled whatever condi-
tions are required to obtain a 
vested benefit - he actually will 
receive it." To attain this goal, sta-
tutes and regulations restrict the 
assignment and alienation of bene-
fits. ERISA provisions therefore 
seek to prevent alienation of bene-
fits, either voluntarily or involun-
tarily. As such, ERISA falls within 
the plain meaning of the term 
"applicable nonbankruptcy law. "47 
These recent opinions reflect the con-
gressional intent set forth in ERISA §2(b ) 
(further buttressed by the holdings in 
Guidry and Mackey) that §206(d)(I) 
erects a general bar to the garnishment 
of pension plans covered by the Act.48 
Unlike prior court decisions which 
ignore the anti-alienation provisions of 
§206( d)( 1 ) on the basis of some vague 
and inconclusive legislative history 
regarding the statute, the recognition of 
§206( d)( 1) as a restriction on aliena-
tion qualifying as "applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law" under §541(c)(2) of the 
Bankruptcy Code serves to further the 
congressional intent of ERISA. It is also 
consonant with the strong view ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court that, in its 
opinion, it was the intention of Congress 
to create a federal exemption from invo-
luntary alienation of pension benefits by 
the adoption of ERISA §206(d).49 
"It would appear . .. that any state 
ERISA pension plan 
exemption statute would be deemed 
preempted by ERISA . ... " 
VI. Exemption of ERISA Plan Pursuant 
to State Exemption 
Provided the debtor's interest in an 
ERISA-qualified pension plan is deter-
mined to be property of the estate under 
§541 ofthe Bankruptcy Code, the next 
question is whether the debtor's inter-
est in an ERISA-qualified pension plan 
may be declared exempt under the per-
tinent state statutory exemption. In this 
regard, the overwhelming majority of 
bankruptcy courts have concluded that 
the various state exemption laws have 
been preempted by § 514( a) of ERISA to 
the extent they apply to ERISA-qualifed 
employee pension benefit plans .. 50 The 
courts have relied upon the Mackey 
decision which concluded that the pre-
emption provision of § 514( a) of ERISA 
displaces all state laws that fall within its 
sphere, even including those state laws 
that are consistent with ERISA's substan-
tive requirements, and that the state law 
will relate to an employee benefit plan, 
under ERISA, if it has connection with or 
reference to such a plan.51 
Many state ERISA plan exemption stat-
utes have not yet been the subject of 
published bankruptcy court opinions on 
the ERISA preemption issue. 52 It would 
appear, however, in light of the clear 
ruling in Mackey regarding the preemp-
tive scope of § 514( a) of ERISA, that any 
state ERISA pension plan exemption stat-
ute would be deemed preempted by 
ERISA and thus rendered ineffective for 
purposes of exemption in bankruptcy. 
VII. Exemption of ERISA Plan Benefits 
Under §522(b)(2)(A) of the 
Bankruptcy Code 
The next issue to be addressed, assum-
ing the debtor's interest in an ERISA-
qualified pension plan is considered to 
be property of the estate under §541, is 
whether the anti-alienation provisions 
of ERISA, set forth at §206( d)( 1), serve 
to create a federal nonbankruptcy exemp-
tion from property of the bankruptcy 
estate under §522(b )(2)(A) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. While most courts that 
considered the issue prior to Guidry 
held that Congress did not intend to 
allow a nonbankruptcy federal exemp-
tion for ERISA plans under that statute, 
in light of the Guidry holding, some 
courts recently have interpreted 
§206( d)( 1) of ERISA as providing a non-
bankruptcy federal exemption pursuant 
to §522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
A. Analysis of §522(b)(2)(A) 
Exemption Prior to Guidry 
1. Majority Analysis - No 
Exemption for ERISA Plans 
Under §522 (b)(2)(A) 
Under §522(b )(2)(A) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, debtors in those states that 
have opted out of the federal bankruptcy 
exemption shceme53 would still be en-
titled to an exemption for their interests 
in ERISA plans provided such an interest 
is characterized as a federal nonbank-
rnptcy exemption. 54 In this regard, the 
vast majority of courts have traditionally 
interpreted the anti-alienation provisions 
of §206( d)( 1) so as not to create a 
separate federal nonbankruptcy exemp-
tion and, in support of this contention, 
have relied upon an interpretation of the 
respective legislative histories of the 
anti-alienation provisiOns of ERISA and 
§522(b )(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Based upon the legislative history of 
§206(d) of ERISA and §522(b)(2)(A) 
of the Bankruptcy Code, until recently, 
nearly every court that has considered 
the issue has held that Congress did not 
intend to allow a federal nonbankruptcy 
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exemption for ERISA plans under 
§522(b )(2 )(A).55 
For example, in In re Licbstrahl,56 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of 
whether a debtor's interest in an ERISA-
qualified pension plan could be exemp-
ted out of the bankruptcy estate pursu-
anuo §522(b )(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy 
Code as "any property that is exempt 
under federal law, other than subsection 
( d) of this section." Because Florida had 
opted out of the federal exemption 
scheme pursuant to §522(d) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the court concluded 
that the debtor's interest could only be 
exempted if the ERISA-qualifed pension 
plan fell within the sphere of 
§522(b)(2)(A) as federal nonbank-
ruptcy law. In looking at whether Con-
gress intended to exempt ERISA-qualifed 
pension plans under §522(b )(2)(A) as 
an applicable federal nonbankruptcy law 
exemption, the court referred to the ap-
propriate House and Senate reports 
which provided a list of property that 
could be exempted under that section. 
Accordingly the Court noted that ERISA-
qualified pension plans were not in-
cluded. Although the court recognized 
that Congress may not have intended 
that list to be exhaustive, it stated that 
Congress' failure to include ERISA within 
the list was nonetheless indicative of 
congressional intent because Congress 
was aware of the existence of the ERISA 
statute when it issued the House and 
Senate reports on §522(b)(2)(A) in 
1977 and 1978, but did not choose to 
include ERISA in those reports. 57 Further, 
when the Licbstrabl court compared 
the ERISA anti-alienation provisions to 
the list of property that could be exemp-
ted under federal law as set forth in the 
House and Senate reports, the court 
noted that, unlike the ERISA pension 
plan anti-alienation provision, the other 
property exemptions were "peculiarly 
federal" in nature, so that Congress 
might have intended to exclude ERISA 
from the federal nonbankruptcy exemp-
tions of §522(b )(2)(A) on those 
grounds as well. Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the failure to mention 
ERISA in connection with §522(b) 
(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code was 
intentional, so that the ERISA anti-
alienation provision, §206( d), would 
not be available to the debtor as a federal 
nonbankruptcy exemption under that 
statute. 58 
2. Komet Analysis - ERISA 
Plan as Federal Nonbank-
ruptcy Law Exemption 
Under §522(b)(2)(A) 
Prior to the Supreme Court's holding 
in Guidry, a few bankruptcy courts dis-
agreed with the analysis of the Eleventh 
Circuit in Licbstrahl. For example, in In 
re Komer, 59 the court, despite the Fifth 
Circuit'S decision in In re GofJ,60 and 
other authority to the contrary, con-
cluded that the ERISA anti-alienation 
provision was in fact a federal nonbank-
ruptcy exemption available under 
§522(b )(2)(A) to debtors in (1) those 
states that had opted out of the federal 
exemption scheme pursuant to § 522( d), 
and ( 2) those states that did not choose 
to opt out of the federal exemption 
scheme but opted to use the applicable 
statutory exemptions rather than the 
alternative federal scheme set forth in 
that section. In so doing, the court 
rejected the "strong dicta to the con-
trary" in Goff,61 and challenged that 
decision on four separate grounds. First, 
the court said Goff erroneously con-
cluded that the only function of the anti-
alienation language in §206( d)( 1) of 
ERISA is to qualify plans for favorable tax 
treatment.62 Instead, said the court, the 
threat of losing tax benefits was merely 
an effective means to induce voluntary 
compliance with ERISA's labor regula-
tions and to enforce the equitable re-
quirements imposed by Part I of ERISA. 63 
Next, the Komet court rejected the 
Goff court's interpretation of the con-
gressional policy behind promulgating 
Bankruptcy Code §522(b)(2)(A). 
While the Goff court stated that the 
Bankruptcy Code was generally intended 
to broaden the "property of the estate" 
available to bankruptcy creditors, and 
was specifically intended to limit any 
exemption ofpensionfunds,64 the Komet 
court stated that "the structure and 
development of the applicable provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code belie this 
conclusion."65 The court argued that 
Goffimproperly assumed that an inten-
tion to bring as much property as possi-
ble into the estate also assumed the 
intention to limit the exempt property 
which could be removed from the estate; 
instead, §541 and §522 serve two very 
discrete purposes which coexist quite 
comfortably without conflict.66 In enact-
ing § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, said 
Komer, Congress chose to depart from a 
scheme which had previously relied 
heavily upon state law to define estate 
property with the simple intent to 
achieve national uniformity and broad 
jurisdiction for the Bankruptcy Court 
consistent with the expanded powers 
conferred on the court by the new 
Code.67 In connection therewith, Con-
gress enacted §522(b) with the intent 
to reflect a policy generally favoring 
debtors retaining their retirement ben-
efits. The legislative history of §522(b) 
clearly reflects a congressional intent to 
accord the debtors sufficient property 
to effectuate a fresh start, "with nary a 
hint of an intent to penalize debtors for 
chosing one exemption scheme over 
the other."68 Consequently, "[A]s 
§522(b )( 2)( A) contemplates honoring 
existing exemptions available under 
'other federal law,' the holding in Com-
mercial Mortgage [Insurance Inc. v. 
Citizens National Bank, 526 F. Supp. 
510 (N.D. Tex. 1981)] representing as 
it does a statement of federal common 
law construing ERISA §206( d)( 1) as an 
exemption, compels this court to honor 
as exempt the benefits accruing from 
ERISA-regulated plans which are in com-
pliance with ERISA §206( d)( 1 )."89 
Third, the Komet court rejected Goffs 
legislative history argument of Bank-
ruptcy Code §522(b )(2)(A), which re-
lies upon the "illustrative list" set forth 
in the House and Senate reports to sup-
port its conclusion that the Code sec-
tion reference to other "applicable fed-
eral law" was not intended to cover 
§206(d)(1) of ERISA. Rather, upon a 
detailed examination of the legislative 
history of §522(b)(2)(A), the court 
concluded, had Congress intended to 
depart from prior law exempting ERISA 
plan benefits in the bankruptcy context, 
it would have done so by choosing 
explicit statutory language: "[I]t is dan-
gerous to rely upon illustrative lists in 
the legislative history to add such a lim-
itation to the statute. "70 Also, the Komet 
court recognized that, in taking the 
legislative history approach, "Goff 
breaks a cardinal rule of statutory con-
struction when it relies so heavily on the 
listing in the legislative history to sup-
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port its conclusion that Congress did 
not intend to include ERISA plans under 
the 'other federal law' rubric," in that, 
where the meaning of the statute is clear 
on its face, it is improper to resort to 
legislative history to interpret the 
statute.71 
Lastly, the Komet court rejected Goffs 
conclusion that the Bankruptcy Code 
was overruled by ERISA, and instead 
stated that the proper analysis when two 
federal statutes conflict is to determine 
whether the two statutes can be con-
strued so as to avoid any conflict. If such 
a way cannot be found, then the conflict 
should be resolved in such a way as to 
serve the congressional intent impressed 
upon both statutes and do the least 
damage to either one.72 Accordingly, the 
court concluded that §522(b)(2)(A) 
permitted a debtor who had elected the 
"state and other federal law" exemption 
scheme to claim his or her ERISA pen-
sion benefit plan, to the extent provided 
by §206(d) of ERISA, as exempt under 
"other federal law" as provided by the 
statute.73 
B. Analysis of §522(b)(2)(A) 
Subsequent to Guidry-
Adoption of Komet Analysis 
Due to the holding in Macktry, as clari-
fied in Guidry, there have been an 
increasing number of courts which have 
supported the proposition set forth in 
Kometthat §522(b )(2)(A) ofthe Bank-
ruptcy Code provides an additional fed-
eral nonbankruptcy exemption for a 
debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified 
pension plan pursuant to the anti-aliena-
tion provisions of§206( d)( 1) of ERISA. 
For example, in In re Starktry,74 the 
court considered objections by Chapter 
7 and Chapter 13 trustees to debtors' 
claims of exemption of their interests in 
pension plans qualified under ERISA, 
and held that pension benefits could be 
properly claimed by the debtors as 
exempt under §522(b)(2)(A) of the 
Bankruptcy Code granting an exemp-
tion in any property that is exempt 
under federal law. In Starktry the debt-
ors were participants in a "401(k)" 
ERISA-qualified benefit plan at their re-
spective places of employment. In each 
case, the debtors had made contribu-
tions to the plan, and benefits attributa-
ble to the debtors' and employers' (ex-
cept as to one debtor) contributions 
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were accrued to the debtors' accounts.75 
Although the court recognized that the 
status of ERISA plans in bankruptcy in 
Colorado had been visited recently by 
the judges of that court,76 those opinions 
needed to be revisited in light of the 
recent Supreme Court decision in 
Guidry which touched, at least in dicta, 
on the problems in interpreting the law 
in that area.77 
The Starktry court began its analysis of 
ERISA plans in bankruptcy with the pro-
visions of §541(c) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, and determined, in that area, no 
law had been clearly developed to estab-
lish that ERISA was not considered 
"other applicable nonbankruptcy law" 
for purposes of §541(c)(2). Further, 
the debtors' pension plans were not 
valid spendthrift trusts meriting exclu-
sion from the bankruptcy estate under 
§ 541 (c)( 2 ).78 Because the court con-
cluded that the debtors' interests in the 
plans constituted property of their re-
spective estates under § 541 of the Code, 
the question then became whether some 
or all of the interests could be claimed 
to be exempt pursuant to the provisions 
of §522(b)(2).79 The court first recog-
nized that Colorado elected to opt out 
of the federal exemption scheme pursu-
ant to § 13-54-107 of the Colorado Re-
vised Statutes, so that the right of the 
debtors to claim an exemption in their 
pension funds was governed by the pro-
visions of§522(b)( 2) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. The court then noted that, under 
Macktry, as well as under a recent deci-
sion from a bankruptcy court in the Dis-
trict of Colorado, the relevant Colordo 
state statutes, C.RS. § 13-54-104 and 
§ 13-54.5-10 I, were preempted by ERISA 
and were also an invalid and uncon-
stitutional attempt by the state to create 
a special bankruptcy exemption.80 
Therefore, the court's analysis of 
.§ 5 2 2 (b)( 2) was restricted to 
§522(b )(2)(A) and whether the debt-
ors' interests in their respective ERISA 
plans were property exempt under other 
applicable federal nonbankruptcy law 
for purposes ofthe statute.81 
In determining whether the provi-
sions of ERISA § 206( d ) constitute a 
separate federal exemption for purposes 
of §522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the court stated that, based upon 
the Supreme Court's holding in Macktry, 
the majority of courts throughout the 
country have concluded that the anti-
alienation prOvisions of ERISA do not 
constitute such a separate federal 
exemption.82 However, the court also 
recognized the analysis set forth by the 
Bankruptcy Court of the Western Dis-
trict of Texas in Komet and noted that 
support for the conclusions reached by 
that court can now be found in the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Guidry. In 
particular, the court looked to the 
Macktry decision, as clarified by Guidry, 
and noted that the dicta in Macktry 
clearly stated that ERISA contains ex-
plicit anti-alienation language for pen-
sion benefits. ERISA, therefore, provides 
a general bar to the alienation or assign-
ment of benefits provided for by ERISA 
pension benefit plans under §206( d)( 1 ), 
rather than merely setting up guidelines 
to qualify pension plans for tax exempt 
treatment, as previously contended by 
the Goffcourt.83 With these statements 
by the Macktry court in mind, the court 
next looked to the Guidry decision 
which revisited Macktry and stated that 
the statutory restrictions on assignment 
or alienation of pension benefits estab-
lished by § 206( d) of ERISA provide a 
bar to the alienation or garnishment of 
ERISA plan benefits, and that such a view 
is consistent with the applicable admin-
istrative regulations, relevant legislative 
history, and views of other federal 
courtS.84 
Based upon a review of the dicta in 
Macktry and the holding in Guidry, the 
court set forth its opinion as follows: 
Considering the dicta in 
Macktry, the holding in Guidry, 
and the strong view expressed by 
the Supreme Court that, in its 
opinion, it was the intention of 
Congress to create a federal 
exemption from involuntary aliena-
tion of pension benefits by the 
adoption of 29 U.S.c. §1056(d) 
(2), this Court concludes that 
ERISA must be considered to be 
another federal exemption for pur-
posesof11 U.S.c. §522(b )(2)(A). 
Thus, the ERISA pension benefits 
of these debtors can properly be 
claimed by them to be exempt 
pursuant to those provisions. The 
conclusion reached by the Court 
is consistent with the legislative 
history and properly harmonizes 
otherwise potentially conflicting 
results.85 
As to the legislative history, the court 
reviewed the committee notes on the 
provisions of §522(b)(2), which set 
forth the list of some items that may be 
exempted under other federal law for 
purposes of that section, and concluded 
the failure of Congress to include the 
ERISA anti-alienation provision on a 
clearly non-exclusive, illustrative list, is 
not probative of an intent to exclude it 
from that list. If Congress had desired to 
limit §522(b )(2)(A) to only certain 
federal laws, it would have done so by 
incorporating the list into the statute 
and making it exclusive rather than 
merely illustrative.86 Further, in recon-
ciling the provisions of § 54 1 (property 
of the estate) and §522(b)(2) (exemp-
tions), the court set forth its analysis as 
follows: 
As to harmonizing potentially 
conflicting or disparate provisions 
of the Code, it is instructive to first 
look to the results which would 
occur in Colorado in the absence 
of a bankruptcy filing. Because 
ERISA preempts the state's gar-
nishment statutes, immediately be-
fore filing of a bankruptcy case a 
judgment creditor in this state 
would not be able to garnish or 
otherwise levy upon any ERISA 
pension benefits of these Debtors. 
By this Court's holding, the same 
result will occur in bankruptcy. 
However, if the anti-alienation pro-
visions of ERISA are not recog-
nized as being another federal 
exemption for purposes of 11 
U.S.c. §522(b )(2), in Colorado 
(and in other opt-out states), a 
debtor would have no exemption 
at all in his bankruptcy case for 
ERISA pension benefits, a result 
clearly not to be countenanced 
under the policy expressed in both 
Mackey and Guidry. 87 
Accordingly, the Starkey court con-
cluded that the debtors were entitled to 
the benefits of the exemptions provided 
by §206( d) of ERISA by virture of 
§522(b )(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Judgment was entered in favor of the 
debtors finding that all benefits in their 
respective ERISA-qualified plans which 
had accrued as of the date the petitions 
were filed were exempt pursuant to 
§522(b )(2).88 This holding set forth by 
the Starkey court reflects a small but 
growing trend among bankruptcy courts 
to allow an exemption for ERISA pen-
sion benefits as "any property that is 
exempt under federal law" pursuant to 
§522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.89 
VIII. Conclusion 
In the aftermath of Mackey, numer-
ous bankruptcy courts and circuit courts 
have rendered decisions serving to void 
state pension plan exemption statutes as 
they "relate to" ERISA-qualified pension 
plans. Additionally, a vast majority of 
bankruptcy courts have also construed 
the legislative history of the related stat· 
utes so as to preclude finding either ( 1 ) 
ERISA is "applicable nonbankruptcy law" 
rr [IJ t would be prudent for 
courts to affirmatively 
declare that ERISA-
qualified pension plans 
are included in the 
r other federal law . .. HI 
for purposes of exclusion from property 
of the estate under §541(c)(2), or 
§206( d) ( the anti -alienability provision) 
creates an available federal exemption 
for plan benefits under §522(b )(2)(A). 
The result of this trend is that the state 
and federal exemptions for ERISA pen-
sion plans, upon which professionals 
have relied heavily to safeguard substan-
tial assets from the reach of creditors, 
have been effectively eliminated. This 
elimination of ERISA pension plan ex-
emptions in the aftermath of Mackey is 
clearly in conflict with the strong view 
expressed by the Supreme Court in 
dicta in Mackey, and as clarified in 
Guidry, that it was the intention of Con-
gress to create a federal exemption from 
involuntary alienation of pension benef-
its by the adoption of the anti -alienation 
provisions set forth in ERISA §206( d). 
Thus, in light of the dicta in Mackey, 
as recently clarified by the holding in 
Guidry, the current state of the law 
regarding ERISA exemptions in bank-
ruptcy needs to be altered in order to 
more effectively reflect the intent of 
Congress in promulgating §206( d) of 
ERISA. Recently, certain decisions com-
ing out of the bankruptcy and district 
courts have recognized the congres-
sional intent behind ERISA, and have 
proposed means for interpreting the 
potentially conflicting provisions of 
ERISA §206(d) and §541 and §522(b) 
of the Bankruptcy Code. The courts 
have proposed two alternative solutions 
to this problem: (1) interpreting 
§ 541 ( c)( 2) of the Code as encompass-
ing the anti-alienation provisions of 
ERISA;90 or (2) providing debtors with 
the right to claim an exemption for their 
interests in- pension funds under the 
provisions of §522(b)(2)(A) of the 
Code.91 
Although a strong argument can be 
made in favor of interpreting §541(c) 
(2) as encompassing the anti-alienation 
provisions of ERISA, that argument may 
be tainted by the fact that such a conclu-
sion would render all ERISA benefits 
excluded from property of the estate. 
Thus, such an interpretation would 
render ineffective §522(d)( 10)(E) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a 
debtor to retain a limited interest in his 
ERISA plan, as a federal exemption, to 
the extent reasonably necessary for the 
support of the debtor.92 
The better approach towards harmo-
nizing the potentially conflicting provi-
sionsof§206(d) of ERISA and §541 and 
§522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is to 
conclude that ERISA must be consid-
ered to be another federal exemption 
for purposes of§522(b )(2)(A). By tak-
ing this approach, the courts will be 
consistent with the congressional intent 
recognized in Mackey and Guidry to 
create a federal exemption from invol-
untary alienation of penSion benefits by 
the adoption of ERISA §206( d), and will 
still recognize the effect and congres-
sional intent behind §541, §522 
(b )(2), and §522( d)( 1O)(E) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. In particular, treating 
ERISA §206( d) as a federal exemption 
for purposes of §522(b)(2)(A) of the 
Code will resolve any conflict between 
§541(c)(2) and §522( d)( 10)(E)while 
still giving effect to both statutes under 
the current interpretation of the major-
ity of bankruptcy courts. Such an inter-
pretation also resolves the potential 
conflict under the current state of the 
law in most bankruptcy courts where a 
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debtor in a state that has not opted out 
of the federal exemption scheme would 
have a limited exemption for ERISA 
benefits under §522(d)(1O)(E) avail-
able, but a debtor in a state that has 
chosen to opt out of the federal scheme 
would have no exemption at all because 
he would be forced to attempt to utilize 
the voided state exemption pursuant to 
§522(b )( 2) ofthe Code. 
Until there is either additionallegisla-
tion in the area of ERISA exemptions, 
either on a state level (making ERISA-
qualified pension plans spendthrift trusts 
under the applicable state law), or on a 
federal level (providing for a specific 
ERISA pension plan exemption in bank-
ruptcy), or until the various United 
States Circuit Courts or the United States 
Supreme Court affirmatively determine 
that ERISA-qualified pension plans qual-
ify as "other federal law" for purposes of 
the §522(b )(2)(A) bankruptcyexemp-
tion, uncertainty will continue to prevail. 
Therefore, to resolve potential conflicts 
in the area of ERISA exemptions in bank-
ruptcy, it would be prudent for courts to 
affirmatively declare that ERISA-qualified 
pension plans are included in the "other 
federal law" for purposes of the 
§522(b)(2)(A) bankruptcy exemption 
so that those conflicts which currently 
exist between the related ERISA and 
Bankruptcy Code provisions may finally 
be put to rest. 
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27Id. at 684. 
28Id. (quoting Guidry v. Sheet Metal 
Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund, 641 F. 
Supp. 360, 363 (D. Colo. 1986)). 
29Id. at 684. 
30Id. at 685 (citing Mackey, 486 us. at 
836). 
31 Guidry, 110 S.Ct. at 685 (emphasis 
added). 
32Id. at 687. As an exception to the con-
gressional policy, the Supreme Court in 
Guidry pointed to § 104( a) of ERISA 
which mandates that the anti-alienation 
provision of §206( d) should not apply 
to a "qualified domestic relations order." 
Id. at 687 n.18. 
3311 US.C §541. Section 541 provides, 
in pertinent part: 
(a) The commencement of a case 
under section 301, 302, or 303 of 
this title creates an estate. Such 
estate is comprised of all the fol-
lowing property, wherever located 
and by whomever held: 
( 1 ) Except as provided in sub-
sections (b) and (c)(2) of this 
section, all legal or equitable in-
terests of the debtor in property as 
of the commencement of the case. 
(c) ... 
( 2) A restriction on the trans-
fer of a beneficial interest of the 
debtor in a trust that is enforceable 
under applicable nonbankruptcy 
law is enforceable in a case under 
this title. 
11 US.C §541. 
34 11 US.C §541(c)(2). 
35In reLichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488, 1489-
90 (11th Crr. 1985). 
36In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162, 1166 
(9th Cir. 1990); In re Brooks, 844 F.2d 
258,261 (5th Crr. 1988); In re Daniel, 
771 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 US. 1016 (1986);ln re 
Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d at 1490; In re 
Graham, 726 F.2d 1268,1271 (8th Crr. 
1984); In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 582 
(5th Crr. 1983). 
37907 F.2d 1476 (4th Crr. 1990). 
38Id. at 1476. 
39Id. at 1477. 
4oId. at 1477-78 (citations omitted). 
41Id_ at 1478 (citations omitted) (quot-
ing In re Ratstin, 61 Bankr. 502, 503 
(Bankr. D.N.]. 1984)). See also McLean 
v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest 
Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204, 
1207 n.l (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
§ 54 1 ( c )( 2) should not be confined in 
its recognition of enforceable transfer 
restrictions to those found in traditional 
spendthrift trusts since the language of 
§ 54 1 ( c )( 2) does not suggest such a 
limitation). 
42See supra note 36 and accompanying 
text. 
43In re Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478-79 ( cit-
ations omitted). Moreover, the court 
noted that, even if the legislative history 
of § 541 (c)( 2) were relevant, the legis-
lative history is inconclusive as to 
whether the term "applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law" in § 541 ( c)( 2) is restricted 
to state spendthrift trust law. Upon 
review of the appropriate passages from 
the House and Senate Reports, the court 
concluded that "[aJt most, these pas-
sages suggest that Congress intended 
state spendthrift trust law to be in-
cluded within the meaning of 'applica-
ble nonbankruptcy law,'" such that the 
congressional emphasis and the legisla-
tive reports on preserving and continu-
ing restrictions on transfer of a state 
spendthrift trust meant only that Con-
gress wanted to ensure that state spend-
thrift trust law be included within the 
restrictions on transfer enforceable 
under "applicable nonbankruptcy law" 
for purposes of §541( c)(2). Id. at 479. 
Accordingly, the court concluded that 
"[NJothing in the legislative history in-
dicates, however, that Congress meant 
'applicable nonbankruptcy law' to refer 
exclusively to state spendthrift trust 
law." Id. 
44Id. at 1479. Additionally, the court 
addressed whether §206( d) of ERISA 
contained an enforceable transfer re-
striciton for purposes of § 541 ( c ) ( 2 ). In 
this regard, the court noted that, since 
ERISA's nonalienability provisions pre-
vent both voluntary and involuntary en-
croachment on vested benefits, neither 
plan participants nor general creditors 
may reach benefits under an ERISA-
qualified profit-sharing and pension 
fund. Accordingly, since the court could 
find no evidence that Congress intended 
to create a situation in which ERISA anti-
alienation provisions would be enforce-
able against general creditors but unen-
forceable against a bankruptcy trustee, it 
concluded that the ERISA anti-alienation 
provisions constituted "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" under which restric-
tions on the transfer of pension inter-
ests could be enforced pursuant to 
§541(c)(2)_Id. at 1480. 
45See also In re Lucas, 924 F.2d 597, 
600-02 (6th Cir. 1991);Inre Wyles, 123 
Bankr. 733, 734-45 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1991);lnreMajul, 119Bankr. 118, 124 
(Banke. W.o. Tex. 1990) (holding that 
the exemption contained in §206( d)( 1) 
of ERISA constitutes "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" for purposes of 
§541(c)(2)). In re Komet, 104 Banke. 
799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); In reRal-
stin, 61 Banke. 502 (Banke. D. Kan. 
1986); In re Mosley, 42 Bankr. 181 
(Banke. D. N.J. 1984); Wan-en v. G.M. 
Scott & Sons, 34 Banke. 543 (Banke. S.D. 
Ohio 1983); In Re 1breewitt, 24 Banke. 
927 (D. Kan_ 1982). 
46917 F.2d 1162 (9th Crr. 1990). 
47Id. at 1169-70 (citations omitted). 
Additionally, Judge Fletcher also recog-
nized the accompanying problems with 
disqualification of an ERISA plan and 
loss of tax exempt status should the 
corpus of an ERISA plan be able to be 
invaded by a bankruptcy trustee. In his 
concurrence, Judge Fletcher noted that, 
in order for a plan to qualify for tax 
exempt status under ERISA, the plan 
must comply with the anti-alienation 
provisions of 26 US.C §40 1 (a )(13) and 
29 US.c. §1056( d)( 1). Consequently, 
the failure to exclude the ERISA-qualified 
plan from the bankruptcy estate would 
violate these provisions and could, there-
fore, subject the plan to ERISA disquali-
fication and loss of tax exempt status.Id. 
at 1170. See also In re Moore, 907 F.2d at 
1480;McLean, 762 F.2dat 1206. Surely, 
Congress did not intend to permit the 
bankruptcy trustee to unilaterally evis-
cerate the protection granted ERISA 
benefit plans simply by attaching a plan 
participant's interest in that plan as part 
of a bankruptcy estate. 
48See also In re Komet, 104 Bankr. 799 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), infra notes 59 
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- 73 and accompanying text; In re 
Starkey, 116Banke. 259 (Banke. D.Colo. 
1990), infra notes 74 - 88 and accom-
panying text; In re Majul, 119 Banke. 
118 (Bankr. W.O. Tex. 1990); In re 
Messing, 114 Banke. 541 (Banke. E.D. 
Tenn. 1990); In re Felts, 114 Banke. 131 
(Banke. W.o. Tex. 1990); In re Burns, 
108 Banke. 308 (Banke. W.O. Okla. 
1989). 
49But see In re Starkey, 116 Bankr. 259, 
262 n.1 (Banke. D. Colo. 1990) (refus-
ing to read §206(d)(l) of ERISA as 
"other nonbankruptcy law" for purposes 
of § 541 ( c )( 2) as more particularly set 
forth infra note 78). 
50See, e.g., In re Morrow, 122 Banke. 151 
(Banke. M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding Fla. 
Stat. §222.21(2)(a), purporting to 
exempt retirement funds from claims of 
creditors, was preempted by ERISA 
§ 514( a)); In re Gaines, 121 Banke. 
1015 (Banke. W.O. Mo. 1990) (holding 
Mo. Rev. Stat. §513.427, which provided 
that bankruptcy debtors may exempt 
from property of the estate any property 
which is exempt from attachment and 
execution under either state or federal 
law, was preempted by ERISA to the 
extent that it purported to allow debt-
ors to exempt ERISA pension benefit 
plans in bankruptcy); In re Majul, 119 
Banke. 118 (Banke. W.O. Tex. 1990) 
(holding that attempts by states to create 
statutory exemptions for ERISA-qualified 
pension plans are invalid as being pre-
empted by the broad preemptive reach 
of ERISA); In re Lee, 119 Banke. 833 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding Flor-
ida pension plan exemption statute pre-
empted by ERISA); In re Martin, 119 
Bankr. 297 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) 
(holding Florida pension plan exemp-
tion statute preempted by ERISA); In re 
McIntosh, 116 Banke. 277 (Banke. N.D. 
Okla. 1990) (holding ERISA preempted 
Oklahoma exemption laws applying to 
ERISA-qualified employee benefit pen-
sion plans); In re Conroy, 110 Banke. 
492 (Banke. D. Mont. 1990) (holding 
Montana pension plan exemption stat-
ute preempted by ERISA); In re Burns, 
108 Banke. 308 (Banke. W.O. Okla. 
1989) (holding Oklahoma pension plan 
exemption statute preempted by ERISA); 
In reAlagna, 107 Banke. 301 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. 1989) (holding Colorado pension 
plan exemption statute preempted by 
ERISA). 
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51See supra notes 13 through 19 and 
accompanying text. It should be noted, 
however, that a small minority of courts 
have held that the state statutory ex-
emption for ERISA-qualified pension and 
profit sharing plans is not pre-
empted by ERISA, and as such, under 
those cases, certain ERISA-type plans 
would be beyond the reach of a trustee 
or creditors in bankruptcy. In re Vickers, 
116 Bankr. 149 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1990); 
In re Williams, 118 Banke. 812 (Banke. 
N.D. Fla. 1990); In re Martinez, 107 
Bankr. 378 (Banke. S.D. Fla. 1989);ln re 
Seilkop, 107 Bankr. 776 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1989); In re Bryan, 106 Bankr. 749 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); In re Volpe, 100 
Bankr. 840 (Banke. W.O. Tex. 1989). 
These cases hold that ERISA does not 
preempt the applicble state statute be-
cause the state statute does not attempt 
to regulate the terms and conditions of 
ERISA plans, but merely provides an 
exemption for profit sharing benefits 
and pension plan money, which is an 
area oflaw traditionally governed by the 
state, and does not interfere with the 
field of employee pension plans now 
governed by federal law. In re Martinez, 
107 Bankr. at 378. In other words, these 
courts have held that the state ERISA 
plan exemption statutes merely com-
plement ERISA's purpose in seeking to 
protect pension money from creditors, 
and therefore, there is no need for ERISA 
preemption absent a conflict between 
the state and federal law. However, this 
approach has been widely discounted 
by the overwhelming majority of bank-
ruptcy courts because it clearly disre-
gards the Supreme Court's broad inter-
pretation of the preemptive language of 
§514(a) of ERISA, as set forth 
in Mackey, and the Supreme Court's 
unequivocal statement that good legis-
lative intentions are insufficient to save a 
state statute from ERISA preemption. 
52For example, there have been no pub-
lished opinions from any of the bank-
ruptcy courts in the State of Maryland 
regarding § 11-504(h) of the Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings article which pro-
vides, in pertinent part: 
(h)Interestinretirementplan. -
( 1) in addition to the exemption 
provided in subsections (b) and 
(f) of this section and any other 
provisions of law, any money or 
other assets payable to a partici-
pant or beneficiary from, or any 
interest of any participant or bene-
ficiary in, a retirement plan quali-
fied under §401(a), §403(b), 
§408, §414(d), or §414(e) of the 
United States Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, as amended, or 
§409 (as in effect prior to Jan-
uary 1984) of the United States 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as 
amended, shall be exempt from 
any and all claims of the creditors 
of the beneficiary or participant .... 
Md. Cts & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 11-
504(b) (1989). 
In substance, the Maryland statute is 
similar to §222.21(2)(a) of the Florida 
Statutes, and nearly all other state stat-
utes which provide exemptions for 
ERISA-qualified pension plans. There-
fore, it is likely that the state statutory 
exemption provided in the Maryland 
statute would be subject to preemption 
by ERISA and, therefore, unavailable in 
bankruptcy, much like virtually all other 
state ERISA pension plan exemption stat-
utes across the country. 
53See supra note 3. 
54See 11 US.C. §522(b)(2)(A), as set 
forth supra note 11, which limits the 
assertion of exemptions by debtors in 
states that have opted out of the federal 
scheme to: (1) the state exemption 
scheme outlined in the applicable state 
statutes; and (2) any federal or applica-
ble state nonbankruptcy exemptions. 
55See, e.g., In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352, 
1359-61 (9th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 
475 US. 1016 (1986); In re Lichstrahl, 
750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985); 
In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1274 
(8th Cir. 1984); In re Goff, 706 F.2d 
574, 581-86 (5th Cir. 1983); In re 
Knowles, 123 Banke. 428,433 (Banke. 
M.D. Fla. 1991); In f'e Rosenquist, 122 
Banke. 775, 782 (Banke. M.D. Fla. 1991); 
In re Morrow, 122 Banke. 151, 155 
155 (Bankr.M.D. Fla 1990);In re Gaines, 
121 Banke. 1015, 1019 (Banke. W.O. 
Mo. 1990); In re Gardner, 118 Bankr. 
860,864 (Banke. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re 
McIntosh, 116 Banke. 277,280 (Banke. 
N.D. Okla. 1990); In re Alagna, 107 
Banke. 301, 314 (Banke. D. Colo. 1989); 
In re Toner, 105 Banke. 978, 980 (Banke. 
D. Colo. 1989); In re Dyke, 99 Banke. 
343,347 (Banke. S.D. Tex. 1989);Inre 
Brown, 95 Banke. 216, 219 (Banke. N.D. 
Okla. 1989); Matter of O'Brien, 94 
Bankr. 583,589 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); 
In re Gribben, 84 Bankr. 494, 497 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Ioe, 83 
Bankr. 641, 646 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988). 
56750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985). 
57Id. at 1491 (citing In re Goff, 706F.2d 
at 585, which contends that the only 
function of the anti-alienation language 
in ERISA is to qualify plans for favorable 
tax treatment). 
58Id. at 1491.SeealsolnreKnowles, 123 
Bankr. 428 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) 
(relying on In re Iicbstrabl, 750 F.2d 
1488 ( 11th Cir. 1985». 
59104 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
1989). 
60706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). 
6lIn re Komet, 104 Bankr. at 805. The 
dicta in Goff, 706 F.2d at 581-86, and its 
supporting rationale was reaffirmed by 
the Eleventh Circuit in In re Iicbstrabl, 
750 F.2d 1448. See supra notes 56-58 
and accompanying text. 
62See In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 585 (stating 
that "ERISA merely provides that as a 
condition of obtaining qualified status 
- with its attendant tax and other 
benefits - a pension plan must pre-
clude alienation or assignment of its 
benefits." (Emphasis in original.) 
63In re Komet, 104 Bankr. at 809. In 
support of this contention, the Komet 
court recognized that §501 of ERISA 
serves to impose criminal liability on any 
person who willfully violates Part I of 
ERISA which includes the anti-aliena-
tion/ anti-assignment language of ERISA 
§206( d)( 1), and further, that ERISA 
§502 serves to impose civil liability for 
the same offense. Id. 
MIn re Goff, 706 F.2d at 587. 
65In re Komel, 104 Bankr. at 809. 
66.ld. at 810. 
67Id. 
68Id at 813. 
7°Id. at 814 (citations omitted). 
7 lId. See also In re Moore, 907 F.2d 
1476; supra notes 39-41 and accom-
panying text. 
72Id at 815-16. 
73Id. at 816. 
· 74116Bankr. 259 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). 
75Id. at 261. 
76See e. g., In re Alagna, 107 Bankr. 301 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); In re Toner, 105 
Bankr. 978 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989). 
77In re Starkey, 116 Bankr. at 261. 
78Id. at 261-62. In this regard, the court 
recognized that a strong argument could 
be made in favor of interpreting 
§ 541 ( c)( 2) as encompassing the anti-
alienation provisions of ERISA, such that 
all ERISA benefits would be excluded 
from property of the estate under that 
section. See, e.g., In re Moore, 907 F.2d 
1476; supra notes 33-41 and accom-
panying text. However, such a conclu-
sion would mean that all ERISA benefits 
would be excluded from property of the 
estate, and as a result, there would never 
be a claim of exemption as to ERISA 
benefits. This interpretation would be 
contrary to §522(d)( lO)(E) which al-
lows, as a federal exemption, a debtor to 
retain at least a limited interest in tax-
advantaged ERISA plans, as well as other 
tax-advantaged pension plans, and would 
render that statute moot. Therefore, the 
Starkey court refused to read 
§201(d)(I) of ERISA as being "other 
applicable nonbankruptcy law" for pur-
poses of § 541 ( c)( 2). In re Starkey, 116 
Bankr. at 262 n.1. 
79In re Starkey, 116 Bankr. at 262. 
SOld. at 262-63 (citing Mackey, 486 U.S. 
825; In re Mata, 115 Bankr. 288 (Bankr. 
D. Colo. 1990». 
81Id. at 263. 
82Id .. 
83Id. at 264 (citing Mackey, 486 U.S. at 
835-39). 
84Id. (citing Guidry, 110 S.Ct. at 685). 
85Id. at 265. 
86Id. 
87Id. (citation omitted). In this regard, 
the Starkey court recognized that this 
conclusion is consistent as well in states 
that have not elected to opt out of the 
federal exemption scheme of §522(d) 
of the Bankruptcy Code in which debt-
ors can choose to either utilize the fed-
eral exemptions under §522(d) or the 
exemptions provided under §522(b) 
(2)( A). Should debtors elect the federal 
exemptions, they would be permitted to 
retain their benefits in an ERISA plan to 
the extent necessary for the support of 
the debtor pursuant to § 522( d)( 10 )(E). 
However, should they elect the benefits 
of other federal exemptions and the 
available state exemptions, pursuant to 
§522(b)(2), then they would be per-
mitted a full exemption for all of their 
ERISA benefits. A contrary conclusion 
would result in debtor's having available 
in the non-opt-out states a limited 
exemption for ERISA benefits under 
§522(d)(1O)(E), but no exemption at 
all should they elect to utilize the state 
exemptions under §522(b )(2). Id. at 
265-66. 
88Id. at 266-67. In this regard, it is 
worthwhile to note that the court, upon 
review of the Fourth Circuit case of 
Tenneco, Inc. v. First Virginia Bank of 
Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688 ( 4th Cir. 1983) 
(cited with approval in Guidry, 110 
S.Ct. at 685 n.12), also held that the anti-
alienation provisions of ERISA were not 
limited to the benefits payable under the 
plan from non-beneficiary contributions, 
but instead extended to all benefits pay-
able under the plan, including the con-
tributions of the debtor to the plan. Id. at 
266. 
89See, e.g., In re Majul, 119 Bankr. 118 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990);InreMessing, 
114 Bankr. 541 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 
1990); In re Felts, 114 Bankr. 131 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Burns, 
108 Bankr. 308 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 
1989). See also In re Komet, 104 Bankr. 
799, supra notes 59-73 and accompany-
ing text. All of the cases cited herein 
support the rationale set forth in Komet 
and Starkey, 116 Bankr. 259, as but-
tressed by the recent Supreme Court 
decisions of Mackey and Guidry. 
90See supra notes 37-48 and accompany-
ing text. 
9lSee supra notes 59-89 and accompany-
ing text. 
92See supra note 78. 
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